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 ABSTRACT 
Endemic Volatility of Firms and Establishments:  Are Real Options Effects 
Important? 
by Vivek Ghosal1 
Consider the intertemporal volatility of the number of firms and establishments 
within an industry over a relatively long span of time. Data from the U.S. 
manufacturing sector shows that this degree of endemic volatility varies widely 
across industries. Examining the determinants of this volatility is important in its 
own right as it reflects on the underlying forces governing entry and exit. In 
addition, data shows that the volatility of firms and establishments is 
significantly correlated with the volatility of the number of production and non-
production workers employed in an industry. The primary focus of this paper is 
to evaluate the role played by the real options channel which suggests that sunk 
costs and uncertainty may be important determinants of the degree of volatility 
of the number of firms. We also control for other factors related to advertising-
intensity, industry growth and technological change. An advantage of the 
manufacturing industry dataset we use in this study is that it combines the 
annual timeseries data from the Annual Survey of Manufactures with data from 
the five-yearly Census of Manufactures. This allows us to construct measures of 
uncertainty about profits, sunk capital costs, technological change, among 
others. Our key findings are: (1) industries with higher sunk capital costs and 
profit uncertainty have significantly lower endemic volatility of the number of 
firms and establishments; and (2) these relationships are non-linear as 
suggested by theory with even small amounts of sunk costs or profit uncertainty 
contributing to significantly lower firm volatility. Our findings appear broadly 
consistent with the predictions of the real options channel. We highlight some 
implications of our findings for antitrust/competition policy and labor market 
dynamics. 
 
Keywords:  Firm and establishment volatility; sunk capital costs; profit uncertainty; 
technological change; antitrust/competition policy; employment dynamics. 
JEL Classification:  L11, L40. 
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 ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Endemische Volatilität von Unternehmen und die Bedeutung von ‚real 
option effects’ 
Betrachtet man die intertemporale Schwankung der Anzahl von Unternehmen 
eines Industriezweigs über einen relativ langen Zeitraum, so zeigen Daten der 
U.S.amerikanischen verarbeitenden Industrie eine große Variation des Grades 
dieser endemischen Schwankungen zwischen unterschiedlichen Industrie-
zweigen. Die Untersuchung der Determinanten dieser Volatilität ist für sich 
genommen bedeutsam, indem sie die Hintergründe für den Markteintritt und -
austritt von Firmen beleuchtet. Darüber hinaus lässt sich eine hohe Korrelation 
zwischen der Schwankung in der Anzahl der Unternehmen und der Volatilität 
der Zahl der Arbeiter, die in der Produktion und in nicht-produzierenden 
Tätigkeiten beschäftigt sind, herstellen. Das Hauptaugenmerk dieses Papier ist 
es zu bewerten, welche Rolle der ‚real options’- Kanal spielt, was impliziert, 
dass ‚sunk costs’ und Unsicherheit entscheidende Bestimmungsfaktoren für 
den Grad an Volatilität der Unternehmenszahl sind. Bei der Untersuchung 
werden auch andere Faktoren, die mit Werbungsintensität, Industriewachstum 
und technologischem Wandel verbunden sind, kontrolliert. Ein Vorteil des in der 
Analyse verwandten Datensatzes liegt darin, dass er jährliche Zeitreihendaten 
aus dem Jahresbericht des verarbeitenden Gewerbes der U.S.A. (Annual 
Survey of Manufacturers) mit Daten des Zensus des verarbeitenden Gewerbes, 
der fünfmal im Jahr erhoben wird, kombiniert. Das gestattet die Konstruktion 
von Maßzahlen zur Unsicherheit über Gewinne, versunkene Kapitalkosten, 
technologischen Wandel, etc.. Die Hauptergebnisse der Untersuchung sind: (1) 
Industriezweige mit höheren versunkenen Kapitalkosten und Gewinnunsicher-
heit zeichnen sich durch signifikant geringere endemische Volatilität in der 
Anzahl der Unternehmen aus; (2) diese Beziehungen sind nicht-linear, wie 
bereits die Theorie vermuten lässt, die besagt, dass schon geringe ‚sunk costs’ 
oder Gewinnunsicherheit zu bedeutend geringerer Schwankungsbreite in der 
Unternehmenszahl beitragen. Die Ergebnisse scheinen insgesamt mit den 
Aussagen zum ‚real options’- Kanal übereinzustimmen. Einige Implikationen der 
Resultate für die ‚Antitrust’- und Wettbewerbspolitik sowie Arbeitsmarkt-dynamik 
werden herausgestellt. 
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     1 While we describe the data later, Table 1 (rows 1 and 2), using data on 266 U.S. manufacturing industries over
the seven Census years 1963-1992, presents summary statistics documenting the wide differences in the volatility
(standard deviation) of the number of firms and establishments across industries.
     2 See Lensink, Bo and Sterken (2002) for an excellent review of the theory and empirical findings. Also see
Driver and Whelan (2001) and Driver et. al. (2002) for alternate issues and methodologies related to investment
outlays. Rosenberg (2002) finds interesting links to labor demand and input choices in general.
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1. Introduction
For a given industry, consider data on the number of firms and establishments over a relatively long span
of time and use this to compute the volatility (standard deviation) of firms and establishments. This gives
us a measure of the longer-run or endemic volatility for that industry. As we examine data for U.S.
manufacturing sector, we find wide differences across industries in this degree of endemic volatility of
firms and establishments.1 While such differences in firm volatility has been documented (Caves, 1998;
Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1988; and Sutton 1997.a), there is relatively little empirical work
highlighting the determinants of this heterogeneity. The central question this paper seeks to shed light
on is: To what extent does the real options channel help explain the observed differences in the endemic
volatility of the number of firms and establishments across industries?
In recent years, the real options channel has been shown to be a key determinant of other aspects
of firm and industry behavior such as investment outlays, capital adjustment and employment.2 While
the theory points to sunk capital costs and uncertainty about profits as potentially important determinants
of firm volatility, there is relatively little empirical work examining these predictions in the context of
firm volatility. The two pillars of the real options channel are sunk capital costs and uncertainty. Sunk
capital costs act as a barrier to entry and this is expected to lower entry and, consequently, exits,
resulting in lower variability of the number of firms. It is well established that greater uncertainty about
profits raises (lowers) the entry (exit) trigger price, implying that industries with greater uncertainty may
be subject to less entry and exit, resulting in reduced firm volatility. Finally, uncertainty in conjunction
with sunk costs exacerbate these effects. In sections 2.1 and 2.2 we review the theoretical insights. In
section 2.3 we examine additional factors that may affect firm volatility such as advertising-intensity,
     3 In this paper we examine the determinants of longer-run, or endemic, volatility of firms and establishments.
Ghosal (2002) examines the shorter-run time-series fluctuations in uncertainty and industry structure. Given our
objective of examining longer-run cross-industry differences, we do not focus on models of learning and the
intertemporal evolution of firms and industries (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericsson, 1998).
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industry long-run growth and technological change.3
Our empirical model is presented in section 3 and the details about data and measurement of
sunk costs, uncertainty, technology, and other variables are presented in Section 4. The estimation results
are presented in section 5. Our empirical findings reveal that greater sunk costs and uncertainty
significantly lower the volatility of the number of firms and establishments within an industry. The
theory (Section 2) suggests that even small amounts of sunk costs or uncertainty are sufficient to induce
a high degree of entry/exit hysteresis and reduce firm volatility, and subsequent increases in these
variables have progressively diminishing effects. We find evidence in favor of such non-linear
relationships. Of the other variables we consider, we find that technology effects as captured by industry
R&D intensity contributes to lower volatility of the number of firms and establishments.
Our findings on sunk costs and uncertainty can be useful for research in several areas. In Section
7 we comment on the implications of our findings for the analysis of competitive effects and entry
conditions in antitrust /competition policy, with particular reference to horizontal mergers. We also note
some implications for labor markets. Our data shows that the cross-industry correlation between the
standard deviation of the number of firms and the standard deviation of production workers is about
0.25; the corresponding correlations are 0.42 for non-production workers and 0.32 for total employment.
The correlations are statistically significant and economically meaningful, implying that turnover of
firms play a key role in determining labor market volatility. Thus examining the determinants of firm
volatility sheds useful light on the functioning of labor markets with implications for search models, job
creation and entrepreneurship.
     4 To simplify, we ignore depreciation. Sunk costs will be relevant for the non-depreciated portion of capital.
     5 In the contestable markets literature, for example, sunk costs are the key determinant of entry and exit.
     6 The simulation results show (Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, Ch.7,8) that the rise (fall) in the entry
(exit) trigger price is substantial for initial, small, increases in sunk costs. While the entry (exit) triggers continue
to rise (fall) as sunk costs rise, the rate is diminishing signifying non-linearity
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2. Theoretical Considerations
2.1. Sunk Capital Costs
For the ith industry, let K be the entry capital requirement, r the unit price of new capital, and N the
resale/scrap price of this capital with r>N. A firm contemplating entry into this industry must take into
consideration the non-recoverable component of entry investment M=(r-N)K, the sunk cost.4 Given that
characteristics of technology and capital vary considerably industries, a priori one expects wide cross-
industry variation in M. Sunk entry capital costs act as a barrier to entry and mobility. This notion has
been used to understand firms’ entry and exit decisions (e.g., Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982; Caves
and Porter, 1977; Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and investment behavior (e.g., Dixit, 1980; Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994; Spence, 1977).5 The key results that emerge from this literature are: (1) when M is
high, entry will be lower and, consequently, exits will also be lower implying that the variance of firms
is likely to be lower; and (2) numerical simulations in Dixit (1989, Fig.2) show that, starting with zero
M, even a small increase in M induces significant entry/exit hysteresis and subsequent increases in M
have a proportionately lesser effect, implying a non-linear relationship.6 Thus, if F(FIRMS)i measures
the volatility (say, standard deviation) of the number of firms for the ith industry, then F(FIRMS)i=g(M)i,
with gM<0 and gM,M>0.
Empirical prediction: Industries with high sunk entry capital costs M i are expected to show lower
F(FIRMS)i. The relationship is likely to be non-linear with initial increases in M showing greater
decreases in F(FIRMS).
     7 The relevant stochastic element can be couched in terms of any relevant variable such as profits, cash-flows,
price, among others. Caballero and Pindyck (1996) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) discuss uncertainty about cash-
flows, profits, among other variables. In the simplest settings, the models consider uncertainty about prices holding
constant input costs and technology; but this term reduces to a profitability interpretation.
     8 In practice, we’re unable to observe the threshold prices PH and PL. In empirical work one typically evaluates
the link between uncertainty and the variable of interest such as entry/exit or investment and make an indirect
inference.
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2.2. Profit Uncertainty
Dixit (1989) models a price-taking risk-neutral firm, with access to a given technology, that maximizes
expected net present value. Let B be a measure of profitability.7 Uncertainty is measured by the
conditional standard deviation of the
process generating B, F(B). Define a pair
of entry and exit trigger prices PH and PL.
In the range (0,PH) the potential entrant
holds on to its option to enter, and over
(PL,4) an incumbent remains in the
industry. Greater F(B) implies an option
value of waiting and this raises (lowers)
PH (PL). Rise in PH lowers entry. PL falls
as the firm knows it has to re-incur sunk
costs upon re-entry and this delays exit. Thus greater F(B) lowers both entry and exit; induces greater
hysteresis. Numerical simulations in Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Ch.7,8) show that: (1)
the entry and exit thresholds widen significantly under greater F(B); and (2) starting from zero F(B),
even small increases in F(B) significantly widen the entry/exit thresholds with subsequent increases
having proportionately lesser effect, implying a non-linear relationship. In short, F(FIRMS)i=f[F(B)]i,
with fF(B)<0 and fF(B),F(B)>0. The above figure provides an illustration (based on the numerical results in
the above papers) of F(B) and price thresholds, PH and PL.8
Turning to imperfect competition, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p.309-315) show that the option
     9 To briefly highlight the issues, start with two potential entrants F(1) and F(2). Let F(1) be the leader and F(2)
follower. Let P(1) be the price at which F(1) enters, and P(2) when F(2) enters, P(2)>P(1); if P>P(2) then F(2)
enters immediately, otherwise it waits for prices to rise above P(2). P(1) exceeds the Marshallian entry trigger due
to uncertainty. Let F(1) earn profits A(1) during the interval of its sole occupancy in the industry; when
P(1)<P<P(2). F(1) rationally expects profits to fall when F(2) enters. Entry by F(2) will truncate the upper end of
the distribution of profit flows. Thus, F(1) must receive a premium before it enters. Of course, in this setting there
is no mechanism determining the leader/follower: this could be determined endogenously or exogenously; who
enters and when depends on the underlying conditions. Now consider simultaneous decision making and P=P(1)+,
(, is small positive). Price is above the entry threshold and since neither firm wants to wait, for the fear of being
preempted by its rival, and could assume leadership role, we could get simultaneous entry. In this case entry could
be faster than in the leader-follower setting described above.
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value of waiting, which slows entry, remains when F(B) is greater. But an oligopolistic setting requires
consideration of pre-emption by rival(s) and this may necessitate a faster response. Therefore, the net
effect is ambiguous.9 The literature which examines the incentives for incumbents or first-movers in
oligopolistic markets to engage in strategic pre-commitments to erect entry barriers shows that it may
be optimal for the incumbent/first-mover to pre-commit (e.g., Appelbaum and Lim, 1985; Spencer and
Brander, 1992). But uncertainty lowers the optimal pre-commitment due to greater uncertainty about
the success of the entry-deterring strategy. Overall, oligopolistic settings highlight the ambiguity of
outcomes, which are critically dependent on model assumptions.
Empirical prediction: Industries with greater F(B) should attract lower entry and, consequently, have
lower exits. Thus F(FIRMS) is expected to be lower in industries with greater F(B). The relationship is
likely to be non-linear with even small amounts of F(B) producing considerable hysteresis and lower
F(FIRMS), but subsequent increases in F(B) generating progressively lesser hysteresis.
Interaction between Sunk Costs and Uncertainty
The results in Dixit (1989) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show that uncertainty and sunk costs by
themselves induce hysteresis in entry and exit. This is expected to lower the volatility of firms. In
addition the results show that the effect of uncertainty, for example, is exacerbated in the presence of
higher sunk costs. This suggests that the empirical model should allow for cross-dependence between
uncertainty and sunk costs.
     10 In our study we do not examine the predictions of the life-cycle models (e.g., Gort and Klepper, 1982;
Jovanovic and MacDonald, 1994) because these models deal with the life-cycle of industries from birth to maturity.
Our study is concerned with which industries have endemically greater or lower volatility in the number of firms
and we use a relatively mature sample of industries. However, even in the life-cycle models, innovations that
emanate from outside the industry facilitate entry and lead to significant positive net entry, while innovations that
emanate from within the industry lead to rise in entry barriers (Gort and Klepper, p.634).
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2.3. Other Considerations
Technological Change
Winter (1984) hypothesizes that when the accumulated stock of technology has emanated from within
the industry via learning-by-doing and other channels (“routinized” regime), outsiders (new entrants)
will have a difficult time making inroads. One way to describe the effects is as follows. In an industry
primarily characterized by routinized regime, the incumbents’ efficiency advantage will be greater; this
asymmetry will make it difficult for entrants to compete. In equilibrium, such industries will be
characterized by lower entry and potentially lower exits. In contrast, when there is new firm innovation
(Winter’s “entrepreneurial” or non-routinized regime), new entrants are more competitive and entry is
facilitated. Thus routinized regime is likely to have an entry-retarding effect whereas an entrepreneurial
regime will be entry-facilitating. In other words, the “inside” versus “outside” industry streams of
innovation are key to determining whether entry is facilitated or hindered.10 Sutton (1997.a; 1998)
provides a review of the literature and additional insights. A general theme emerging from Audretsch’s
(1995) empirical results is that higher industry-wide innovation results in reduction of new startup firms
and decreases the survival chances of new firms. In contrast, new firm survival rate is much higher
where new firm innovation rate is higher. These findings lend support to Winter’s hypotheses. Thus, the
effect of technological change on F(FIRMS) will depend on whether the innovations are emanating from
outside or inside the industry. Given that both types are likely to be prevalent in the data, the net effect
appears to be ambiguous.
     11 As noted in section 4, for each industry we compute the standard deviation of the (detrended) number of firms
over the seven Census years, 1963-92. This gives us an industry-specific measure of endemic volatility, F(FIRMS)i.
In our estimated regressions, we use F(FIRMS)i as the dependent variable for which we have 266 observations.
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Additional Factors
We consider some additional control variables that may influence F(FIRMS). First, we control for
industry advertising intensity. Greater advertising intensity may have both entry-retarding as well as
entry-enhancing effects (Kessides, 1986). The former may reduce entry due to advertising related sunk
cost barriers and, consequently, exits will also be lower leading to lower F(FIRMS). The latter implies
that a greater differentiated array of products may facilitate entry into “niche” market segments. The net
effect appears to be ambiguous. Second, in some secondary specifications, we include the industry’s
mean rate of growth over the sample period. Greater growth may result in facilitate entry (turnover)
resulting in increased F(FIRMS), but this effect is likely to be conditioned on barriers-to-entry.
3. Empirical Model
Let F(FIRMS)i be a measure of the degree of endemic volatility of the number of firms for a given
industry. Our objective is to examine differences across industries in F(FIRMS)i.11 We also examine the
differences across industries in the volatility of the total number of establishments F(ESTBS)i. An
establishment is defined as an economic (production) entity operating at a location; a firm can have more
than one establishment. The number of establishments could increase or decrease as firms enter or exit
the industry. But they could also increase (decrease) if incumbent firms expand (contract) operations,
say, by entering (exiting) new (existing) geographic markets. This can be viewed as providing some
complementary information about entry/exit and volatility.
The relationship that we will estimate is given by:
(1) F(FIRMS or ESTBS)i = "F(B)i$Mi(Ti*ADi>RNZiLi,
8where ‘i’ indexes industry, F(FIRMS or ESTBS) is the standard deviation of the number of firms (or
establishments), F(B) is profit uncertainty, M sunk capital costs, T a measure of technological progress,
AD is advertising intensity, Z represents a vector of potentially other control variables (section 2.3) with
R the corresponding vector of coefficients, L a random error term, and ", $, (, * and R are the
coefficients to be estimated. In theory, the effect of F(B), for example, is (i) potentially non-linear and
(ii) conditioned on M. The above specification allows for these non-linearities and cross-dependence.
From the option value channel, F(B) and M are expected to lead to lower firm volatility, implying $<0
and (<0. With $<0 and F(B)>0, we have MF(FIRMS)/MF(B)<0 and M2F(FIRMS)/MF(B)2>0. The degree
of curvature will depend on the value of $. For the cross-dependence of uncertainty and sunk costs,
assuming all other variables are constant and dropping industry subscripts, we simplify (1) to get
F(FIRMS)= TF(B)$M(, where T is a constant. Taking the total differential we get:
(2) dF(FIRMS) = $F(B)$-1M(dF(B) + (F(B)$M(-1dM + $(F(B)$-1M(-1dF(B)dM,
ignoring the higher-order terms. Given that $, (<0 and F(B), M>0, the first two terms are negative and
the last term positive. From our estimated equations, we evaluate both the curvature of the relationships
and the extent of cross-dependence between F(B) and M.
We estimate (1) in log-linear form (Rn denotes logarithms):
(3) RnF(FIRMS or ESTBS)i = Rn"0 + $RnF(B)i + *RnMi + (RnTi + >RnADi + RRnZi + RnLi.
Potential Endogeneity of F(B)
The theory indicates that the effects of uncertainty in part may depend on market structure (see
discussion at end of section 2.2). Further, market structure itself is likely to be determined by the forces
governing entry and exit. While several factors need to fall in place, F(B) may be endogenous. Given
     12 Consider the following about the U.S. manufacturing sector: (1) it accounts for roughly 20% of GDP and (2)
is disaggregated into 450 SIC 4-digit industries. Thus a typical 4-digit manufacturing industry is less than 0.05%
of the U.S. economy. Given this, it is difficult to visualize how prices of energy inputs like coal, electricity, gas
and petroleum would be endogenous to a given 4-digit industry.
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this, we estimate (3) using OLS as well as Instrumental Variables methods and conduct Hausman tests.
For IV estimation, finding industry-specific variable(s) that will be correlated with F(B)i and
uncorrelated with the error term Li is a rather difficult proposition. The first instrument we consider is
industry-specific energy prices. Industry energy inputs could include coal, electricity, natural gas,
petroleum, etc. Arguably, prices of these inputs are being determined in national and global markets.
Thus, energy prices can be treated as exogenous to a given SIC 4-digit manufacturing industry.12 We
construct a relative energy price variable ei=(energyi/GDP Deflator) and use the standard deviation of
ei over our sample period - F(e)i - as an industry-specific instrument for F(B)i.
We also considered a second instrument related to industry-specific materials prices. For
example, for the paper industry, wood-pulp is a critical input along with various chemicals used in
production processes. Prices of wood-pulp and chemicals, among others, will comprise the industry-
specific materials price for this industry. In some cases these input prices may arguably be determined
exogenously to the 4-digit industry under consideration; for example, if steel is a critical input, one could
argue that steel prices are typically being determined in broader national and global markets. But in other
cases this may not be so; for example, the paper industry is a very large consumer of wood-pulp and if
this industry starts growing (contracting) rapidly then it may well influence wood-pulp prices. Thus,
materials prices may be exogenous for many industries, but not so in others; a priori this is difficult to
resolve. We construct a relative materials price variable mi=(materialsi/GDP Deflator) and use the
standard deviation of m i - F(m)i - as an industry-specific instrument for F(B)i.
4. Data
Our data are for the U.S. SIC 4-digit manufacturing industries and our full sample includes 266
     13 That is, for each industry we computed the [ESTBS/FIRMS] ratio and then examined the cross-industry
distribution of this ratio. The rough correspondence of course conceals the fact that larger firms typically tend to
be multi-product and multi-establishment. Since the Census dataset does not contain information on firm size and
does not allow us to match establishments to firms, we cannot explore this issue in detail.
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industries. The data appendix provides details about sources, time periods, sample size and measurement
of sunk costs and technological change.
4.1. Industry Structure
We collected data on the total number of firms in an industry (FIRMS) and the number of
establishments (ESTBS).  These data are from the 5-yearly Census of Manufactures over 1963-1992 for
a total of 7 observations; these data are not available at an annual frequency. To gauge the
correspondence between FIRMS and ESTBS, we examined the cross-industry distribution of the ratio
[ESTBS/FIRMS]. The 50th percentile value is 1.1 and this rises to 1.6 at the 90th percentile level,
indicating a rough correspondence between the number of firms and establishments in an industry.13
Our objective is to first compute the standard deviation of FIRMS and ESTBS for each industry;
this gives us an industry-specific measure of the intertemporal volatility. Given our sample size, we
obtain 266 observations. Then we use equation (3) to examine the determinants of these standard
deviations across industries. Our examination of the data on FIRMS and ESTBS revealed that many
industries have a distinct trend in these variables over our sample period. These trends could be
generated by myriad forces including, for example, changing nature of import-competition and export-
orientation, changes in the regulatory environment, among others. It is not the objective of this paper to
study these secular long-run trends. Keeping this in mind we detrended the data on FIRMS and ESTBS.
For each industry using data for the seven Census years (1963-1992), we estimated the regression
(4) FIRMS(or ESTBS)i = a + bTrendi + ei
11
and labeled the detrended data as dFIRMS and dESTBS. Then for each industry we computed the
standard deviation of these detrended data, F(dFIRMS) and F(dESTBS).  These were used in our
estimated regression (3). We also present results with non-detrended data; the standard deviations of
which are labeled F(FIRMS) and F(ESTBS). As we show later, our broad conclusions are not dependent
on the specific variable we use, F(dFIRMS) or F(FIRMS). In Table 1 (rows 1 and 2) we present the
cross-industry summary statistics on F(dFIRMS) and F(dESTBS), which reveal substantial differences
across industries in the volatility of the number of firms and establishments.
4.2. Sunk Costs
In section 2 we noted that, abstracting from depreciation considerations, sunk costs corresponded to the
non-recoverable component of entry capital investment M=(r-N)K, where K is the entry capital
requirement, r the unit price of new capital and N the resale price (or scrap value) of this capital.
Unfortunately, obtaining data on N is extremely difficult implying that we can’t measure M directly for
our 266 industries. Instead, we pursue an alternate approach.
The theoretical models (section 2) treat sunk costs as proportional to entry capital requirements.
We adopt the methodology outlined in Kessides (1990) and Sutton (1991) to obtain proxies for sunk
costs. The extent of sunk capital outlays incurred by a potential entrant will be determined by the
durability, specificity and mobility of capital. While these characteristics are unobservable, one can
construct proxies. Following Kessides, let RENT denote the fraction of total capital that a firm (entrant)
can rent: RENT=(rental payments on plant and equipment/capital stock). Let USED denote the fraction
of total capital expenditures that were on used capital goods: USED=(expenditures on used plant and
equipment/total expenditures on new and used plant and equipment). Finally, let DEPR denote the share
of depreciation payments: DEPR=(depreciation payments/capital stock). These proxies are useful
because if a potential entrant can buy used capital, or can lease capital, then sunk costs are
correspondingly lower. Similarly, depreciation makes capital less sunk; in the limiting scenario if capital
     14 Collecting these for some of the additional (particularly, earlier) years presented problems due to changing
industry definitions and many missing data points. Our data revealed fairly high correlation (between 0.6-0.9) for
the sunk cost proxies across the different years, indicating a fair degree of stability in these measures.
12
lives only for one period,  then sunk costs, which arise from the non-depreciated component of capital,
are negligible. We create the following three measures: M(RE)=(1/RENT); M(US)=(1/USED); and
M(DE)=(1/DEPR). High M(RE) indicates low-intensity rental market, implying higher sunk costs. High
M(US) signals low-intensity used capital market, implying higher sunk costs. High M(DE) indicates that
capital decays slowly, implying higher sunk costs which arise from the undepreciated portion of capital.
The final measure M(EK) is from Sutton (1991); details are provided in the data appendix. This is a
measure of median entry capital requirement based on the observed distribution of plant sizes. As in
Sutton and the models noted in sections 2.1 and 2.2, sunk costs are assumed to be proportional to M(EK).
We collected data to construct M(RE), M(US), M(DE) and M(EK) for the Census years 1972, 1982 and
1992.14
In our estimation, we report results with these measures used separately. However, in our
baseline specification, we use a “weighted” index of sunk costs capturing elements of all the attributes
described above: M(W)=[N1M(RE)+N2M(US)+N3M(DE)+N4M(EK)], where N i’s are the weights. Due
to lack of information which can be used to assign optimal weights N, we assume that N i=0.25  i. For
each variable, we use the mean value (computed over 1972, 1982 and 1992) in our estimated equation
(3). Table 1 presents summary statistics for M(RE), M(US), M(DE), M(EK) and M(W) and Table 2
presents the cross-industry correlations between F(FIRMS) and F(ESTBS) and the various sunk costs
measures. The correlations reveal that industries with higher sunk costs have lower endemic volatility
of firms and establishments.
4.3. Uncertainty
For the real options models, uncertainty is a key variable. It is also a rather difficult to construct
empirically. While theory suggests several state variables that can be used to measure uncertainty, we
     15 Sutton (1997.a, p.52-53) notes the primary importance of the volatility of industry profits in affecting entry
and exit decisions. Our construction of the uncertainty measure is consistent with previous work; see, e.g.,
Aizenman and Marion (1997), Lensink, Bo and Sterken (2002), Ghosal and Loungani (1996, 2000) and Huizinga
(1993). In these studies, the standard deviation (or the conditional standard deviation) of some variable of interest
measures uncertainty.
     16 This is consistent with theoretical definition of short-run profits (Varian, 1992, Ch.2). Empirically, this is a
commonly used measure; see Carlton and Perloff (1994, Ch.9), Domowitz et al. (1986, 1987), Geroski and Mueller
(1990), Ghosal (2000) and Machin and Van Reenen (1993). Carlton and Perloff (p.334-343) and Schmalensee
(1989) discuss alternate measures and their pitfalls. Our measure A does not control for capital costs, which are
more important for measuring the level of long-run profitability. Carlton and Perloff and Schmalensee note that
quantifying capital costs is difficult due to problems related to valuing capital and assessing depreciation.
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use a bottom-line measure - profitability - which is a key concern for firms making entry and exit
decisions. Firms are assumed to use a forecasting equation to predict future profits. This filters out the
systematic components and the standard deviation of the residuals - the unsystematic component -
measures profit uncertainty.15 We measure industry profitability per unit of sales, assuming that
intermediate materials, energy and labor comprise the total variable costs. Our main measure of
profitability is given by B (measure M1 in table below).16
Profitability Measures; Forecasting Specifications; Measures of Uncertainty.
A. Profitability Measures.
(M1) B=(Sales Revenue-Variable Costs)/(Sales Revenue)
(M2) B(depr)=(Sales Revenue-Variable Costs-Depreciation Expenditures)/(Sales Revenue)
B. Forecasting Specifications.
(S1) Bi,t = " + 8j3 jBi,t-j + >k3kSALESi,t-k + (m3mUNt-m + ,i,t
Uncertainty measure: F(B:S1) 
(S2) Bi,t = " + 8j3 jBi,t-j + >k3kSALESi,t-k + *n3nFFRt-n + Jp3pENERt-p + Li,t
Uncertainty measure: F(B:S2)
(S3) Bi,t = " + 8j3 jBi,t-j + T i,t
Uncertainty measure: F(B:S3)
 (S4) Bi,t = " + trend+ 8j3 jBi,t-j + >k3kSALESi,t-k + (m3mUNt-m + ui,t
Uncertainty measure: F(dB:S1)
The benchmark profit forecasting specification S1 includes lagged values of B to capture the
     17 We present some summary statistics from the regressions S1 estimated to measure uncertainty. Across the
266 industries, the mean Adjusted-R2 and the standard deviation of adjusted-R2 were 0.61 and 0.24, respectively.
The first-order serial correlation was typically low, with the cross-industry mean (std. dev across industries) being
-0.019 (0.067). Overall, the fit of the industry regressions was good.
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variable’s own dynamics, industry-specific sales growth (SALES) and economy-wide unemployment
rate (UN). The justification for such a specification is contained in Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen
(1986) and Machin and VanReenen (1993) which show the sensitivity of profit-margins to industry-
specific and aggregate economic conditions. For each industry in our sample, we first estimate
specification S1 using annual data over the entire sample period 1958-1994.17 The residuals represent
the unsystematic components. The standard deviation of residuals, F(B:S1)i, is our primary industry-
specific measure of uncertainty. Table 1 presents the summary statistics on F(B:S1) and Table 2 presents
the correlation with F(FIRMS) F(ESTBS). The correlations indicate that industries with greater
uncertainty have lower firm and establishment volatility. These correlations are marginally larger than
those observed for the sunk cost proxies.
We conducted the following checks for robustness:
(1) Consider the alternate specifications S2, S3 and S4. The motivation for S2 is from the results in
Ghosal (2000) where we  replace the broad business cycle indicator, unemployment rate, by the federal
funds rate (FFR) and energy price growth (ENERGY). Specification S3 is a basic AR(2) model.
Specification S4 is motivated by the argument that for some industries the data on B may be non-
stationary. If so, the measured standard deviation of B will be high. However, this may not necessarily
reflect greater uncertainty if the trends are predictable. To control for non-stationarity, we estimate the
forecasting equation by including a trend and then measuring uncertainty.
(2) Construct an alternate measure (M2) of profitability B(depr) which accounts for depreciation
expenditures. The data on industry-specific depreciation rates were collected for the Census years 1972,
1982 and 1992 (same as those used to create the DEPR sub-samples). We assumed that these data are
representative for the entire sample period and constructed B(depr). We used B(depr) in conjunction with
     18 Domowitz, et al. (1986), for example, note that most SIC 4-digit manufacturing industries had reached steady-
state values of advertising-intensity by early 1960's. So considering advertising-intensity data from the mid-point
of our sample appears reasonable.
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S1 to compute an alternate measure F[B(depr)].
In Section 5 we report results for these additional checks; our broad inferences are not affected.
4.4. Other Control Variables
As noted in section 2.3, we control for additional factors related to advertising-intensity, industry
growth and technology. The data on advertising-intensity (ADVT) are from the detailed FTC line-of-
business data (see data appendix). While the data are high quality, they are only available for a limited
number of years. In our estimation we assume that the data on ADVT are representative for the full
sample period.18 Industry growth (GRS) is the mean industry-specific rate of growth of real sales over
the sample period. Table 1 presents the summary statistics on ADVT and GRS which reveal large cross-
industry differences.
We use two measures of technological progress. The first measure is industry R&D intensity.
The basic assumption being that industries with higher R&D will show greater technological progress
and cost-efficiency gains. As noted in the appendix, the R&D data are from the FTC line-of-business
files and are available only for a limited number of years. In our estimation we assume that these data
on R&D are representative for the full sample period. Audretsch (1995, p.27-29) and Cohen and Levin
(1989), for example, highlight limitations linking R&D expenditures to technological change and market
opportunities. Given some of the criticisms, we construct a second measure: total factor productivity
growth, TFP. For a four-factor (capital stock, K; labor hours H; materials, M; and energy, E) production
function, the basic Solow residual is: TFP(0)t = [Îqt - ((ktªkt+(htªht+(mtªmt+(etªet)], where q, k, h, m
and e are logarithms of output and the four inputs, and (C the input share. The literature has shown that
there can be significant deviation between true technological change and TFP(0). Inputs like capital have
variable “utilization” over the business cycle, imparting a strong procyclical bias to TFP(0); see Burnside
     19 The basic intuition is that these inputs (materials and energy) do not have a cyclical utilization (or “hoarding”)
component like capital and, therefore, are good proxies for the utilization of capital; e.g., assuming capital stock
is constant, if the utilization of capital increases, then materials and energy usage will typically increase.
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et al. (1995), Burnside (1996) and Basu (1996). Burnside et al. (1995) use electricity consumption to
proxy utilization of capital and obtain a corrected Solow residual; other proxies have included total
energy consumption and materials inputs.19 Following this literature, we construct a factor-utilization-
adjusted technology residual TFP(m) (see data appendix for details). In our estimated regression (3),
we use the industry-specific mean value of TFP(m) computed over the full sample period. Table 1
presents the summary statics on R&D and TFP(m) and Table 2 presents the cross-industry sample
correlations, which show a negative relationship between the measures of innovation and F(FIRMS) and
F(ESTBS). The relationship is a stronger negative for R&D as compared to TFP(m).
5. Estimation Results
Baseline Results
These results are reported in Table 3. Columns 1-6 present the results for F(dFIRMS) and
F(dESTBS) using OLS and IV methods. As noted in section 3, the standard deviation of industry-
specific energy and materials prices, F(e)i and F(m)i, are used as instruments for the potentially
endogenous variable F(B)i. The raw correlations between F(B)i and F(e)i and F(m)i are 0.29 and 0.12,
respectively. Given that energy prices are arguably exogenous to a given SIC 4-digit industry, F(e)i is
a better instrument. In addition it is more highly correlated with the included potentially endogenous
variable F(B)i. The Hausman tests cannot reject the null that F(B)i and the error term are uncorrelated.
These inferences are the same for the F(dFIRMS) and F(dESTBS) regressions. Finally, while the
estimated F(B)i coefficients are larger for the IV estimator, the broad qualitative inferences are similar
for the OLS an IV estimates. Given our results, we treat F(B)i as exogenous and use the OLS estimates
to describe our results.
From Table 3, the F(B)i estimates are negative and highly significant for both F(dFIRMS) and
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F(dESTBS). Given the standard errors, the point estimate of F(B) is roughly similar for the F(dFIRMS)
and F(dESTBS) regressions. The results for the sunk cost measure M(W) indicate the same pattern.
Given the standard errors, the M(W) effect is somewhat smaller than the F(B) effect. The R&D
coefficient is also negative, but quantitatively much smaller and of lower statistical significance than the
uncertainty and sunk cost estimates. The advertising-intensity estimate is also negative but not
significant at conventional levels.
Next we focus more closely on uncertainty and sunk costs. Using the estimates from Table 1
(col.1), equation (1) becomes:
(4) F(dFIRMS)i = 13.46F(B:S1)i-0.962M(W)i-0.886R&Di-0.087ADVTi-0.060.
Figures 1-2 provide a graphical look at the estimated relationships. Using (4) above, Figure 1 plots the
relationship between F(dFIRMS) and F(B:S1) assuming all other variables are held at their cross-
industry sample mean values. The theory indicates that the negative effect should be greater for initial
small values of F(B:S1) and the incremental effect diminishes as F(B:S1) gets larger; Figure 1 lends
support for this prediction. Similarly, Figure 2 plots the estimated relationship between M(W) and
F(dFIRMS). As in the case of F(B:S1), the relationship displays the pattern predicted by theory. The only
difference worth noting is that the graph for M(W) shows greater curvature than F(B:S1). We don’t plot
the relationships for F(dESTBS), but they are roughly similar to those for F(dFIRMS).
Regarding the quantitative effects, a natural way of evaluating them is to consider a one-
standard-deviation (one-s.d.) change in F(B:S1) and/or M(W). From Table 1, the cross-industry standard
deviation of F(B:S1) is 0.011 and M(W) is 29.6. Using equation (4) and starting from the cross-industry
mean values of all variables, if F(B:S1) increases by one-s.d. from 0.027 to 0.038, then F(dFIRMS)
decreases from 37.72 to 23.24. Similarly, starting from the mean values of all variables, if M(W)
increases by one-s.d. from 32.5 to 62.1, then F(dFIRMS) decreases from 37.78 to 21.28. Regarding the
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cross-dependence of the F(B:S1) effect on M(W), consider the following. First, consider F(B:S1)
increasing by one-s.d. from 0.027 to 0.038 which results in F(dFIRMS) decreasing from 37.72 to 23.24.
Second, now let M(W) also increase by one-s.d. This results in F(dFIRMS) decreasing from 23.24 to
14.85. So the combined effects of uncertainty and sunk costs impart a large downward effect on an
industry’s intertemporal volatility of the number of firms. Overall, the quantitative effects are large and
economically meaningful.
We summarize our basic findings as follows:
(1) Higher profit uncertainty and sunk costs are associated with significantly lower volatility of the
number of firms and establishments. The relationship is best characterized as non-linear in the manner
predicted by the theories discussed in section 2. The quantitative effects are economically meaningful.
(2) The technology effect as captured by R&D intensity is weakly significant (statistically) for
F(dFIRMS); the significance level is higher for F(dFIRMS). Starting from the mean values of all
variables, a one-s.d. increase in R&D intensity lowers F(dFIRMS) from 37.72 to 35.36. For both
F(dFIRMS) and F(dESTBS), the quantitative effect of R&D is small.
(3) The sign of the advertizing intensity coefficient is negative, but not significant at conventional levels.
Additional Results
In Tables 4-6 we report some additional results to check the robustness of our baseline findings.
(1) In Table 4 we present some extended results by augmenting our basic equation with the total factor
productivity and industry growth variables, TFP(m) and GRS. Neither of these variables appear
important in explaining F(dFIRMS) and F(dESTBS). As for Table 3, the Hausman tests cannot reject
the null that F(B:S1) is uncorrelated with the error term. The OLS estimates from Table 4 closely mirror
those of Table 3 and our qualitative and quantitative inferences are not affected.
(2) In Table 5 we reproduce the results from Table 3 after dropping the weighted sunk cost measure
M(W) and using the individual sunk cost proxies instead. The F(B:S1) effects are quite similar across
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the four columns. For the sunk cost proxies, the qualitative inferences are similar, but the quantitative
effects vary somewhat. The R&D effects vary in both statistical significance and quantitative effect
across the columns. The advertising effect is almost non-existent.
(3) In Table 6 we present additional checks for robustness. For comparison, column A reproduces the
results from the first column of Table 3. The remaining columns are as follows:
(a) In section 4.3 we noted alternate forecasting equations to measure uncertainty: F(B:S2), F(B:S3) and
F(B:S4). These results are reported in columns B, C and D;
(b) We considered an alternate measure of profitability F[B(d)] which accounts for depreciation
expenditures and measuring uncertainty using this. These results are reported in column E;
(c) Our estimation so far used detrended data on FIRMS and ESTBS (equation (4)) to construct the
volatility measure. The last column F presents results where the data on FIRMS were not detrended.
As is evident from Table 6, these additional checks do not alter our broad conclusions regarding the role
played by profit uncertainty and sunk costs in explaining the cross-industry variation in the volatility of
the number of firms and establishments. Our baseline results and inferences from Table 3 remain intact.
6. Discussion
Our study reveals interesting and economically meaningful effects of sunk capital costs and uncertainty
about profits on the volatility of the number of firms and establishments. Figures 1 and 2 display our key
findings. Industries with greater sunk capital costs and profit uncertainty show lower intertemporal
volatility of firms and establishments. These relationships are non-linear in the sense that initial small
increases in sunk costs or profit uncertainty appear to have a relatively larger impact than subsequent
increases. To put it differently, small amounts of sunk costs and uncertainty appear sufficient to generate
noticeable hysteresis in entry/exit, reducing the volatility of firms and establishments within an industry.
This is consistent with the theoretical insights obtained from the real options literature (Dixit, 1989; and
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The results on technological change are mixed. Using R&D intensity to proxy
     20 Also see Cabral and Mata (2003) on the link between financial market frictions and entry/exit.
     21 Williamson (1988, p.571) writes: “Of the several dimensions with respect to which transactions differ, the
most important is the condition of asset specificity. This has a relation to the notion of sunk cost...” (p.580) “In
the event of default, the debt-holders will exercise pre-emptive claims against the assets in question....The various
debt holders will then realize differential recovery in the degree to which the assets in question are
redeployable...the value of a pre-emptive claim declines as the degree of asset specificity deepens...”. In Shleifer
and Vishny (1992), asset specificity is a determinant of leverage and explains cross-industry and intertemporal
patterns of financing; e.g., the ease of debt financing is inversely related to the degree of asset specificity.
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technical change, we find that greater R&D lowers firm and establishment volatility. But total factor
productivity growth does not explain much of the cross-industry variation in volatility. Advertising
intensity appears to have a minimal impact.
Apart from the real options effects described in sections 2.1 and 2.2, there may be additional
reasons why M and F(B) could influence F(FIRMS). For example, firms often rely on external credit for
their entry/investment decisions. An important literature has highlighted the role played by profit
uncertainty and sunk costs on firms’ access to external credit. For conciseness, we only reference the
papers directly relevant for our analysis. First, consider profit uncertainty F(B). Greenwald and Stiglitz
(1990) consider a firm where decision makers maximize expected end-of-period equity minus an
expected cost of bankruptcy; the latter plays a key role in decision making. The key results relevant for
our analysis are that greater F(B): (1) increases the absolute and incremental risk of bankruptcy at any
level of investment since they cannot absorb the increased risk by issuing more equity, and (2)
exacerbates borrowing constraints. Thus obtaining capital for entry/investment projects will be more
difficult when F(B) is greater.20 Second, consider sunk costs M. The basic result is that lenders will be
more reluctant to provide financing if capital embeds large sunk costs (Williamson, 1988; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1992) because when asset specificity is high, capital is likely to have low resale value.21 Since
collateral will have less value, lenders will find it more difficult to recover the loaned capital. Thus,
greater M is likely to tighten borrowing constraints, making it more difficult to obtain capital for
entry/investment projects. In summary, the access to external credit is likely to be more difficult in
industries characterized by high F(B) and M as these exacerbate informational asymmetries and tighten
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borrowing constraints. This will likely lead to lower entry and, consequently, exits. Thus, via the credit
market effects, F(FIRMS) may be lower. However, to carefully sort out the differential effects of the real
options channel versus the credit markets channel, one will need to have detailed data on firm size,
financial variables and other firm-specific data. We are pursuing this in our ongoing research.
7. Implications
We focus on the potential implications of our findings for competition policy analysis, and understanding
labor market dynamics. First, we focus on antitrust/competition policy analysis, and horizontal mergers
in particular. The analysis here was conducted using data for SIC 4-digit industries and we cannot make
direct linkages to markets as defined in antitrust analysis which tend to be much more disaggregated and
detailed. A similar analysis carried out using more disaggregated data may reveal additional insights.
Here we draw some broad implications. The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997) - henceforth, “Guidelines” - notes that the ultimate objective of
horizontal merger analysis is to determine (Guidelines, p.3) “...whether the merger is likely to create or
enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise.” In evaluating this, the Guidelines contain a detailed
analysis of entry. “Uncommitted entrants” are defined as those who are likely to (p.11) “...enter within
one year and without the expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and exit,” where sunk costs are
defined to include (p.12) “...investments in production facilities, technologies, marketing, R&D,
regulatory approvals and testing.” In contrast, (p.26) “committed entry” is defined as “...new
competition that requires expenditure of significant sunk costs of entry and exit,” and the Guidelines
(p.25-30) lay out a three-step methodology to assess whether committed entry would counteract a
competitive effect of concern. The broad picture that emerges is a clear recognition of the role played
by sunk costs in determining entry and the consequent evaluation of competitive effects. Our findings
related to sunk costs can be interpreted at two levels. First, our estimates imply that sunk costs are likely
to induce entry/exit hysteresis, validating the concerns laid out in the Guidelines. Second, and perhaps
     22 The regressions being: (a) RnF(dEMP or dPW or dNPW)i = Rn"0 + $RnF(dFIRMS)i + Rnei; and
(b) RnF(dEMP or dPW or dNPW)i = Rn"0 + $RnF(B)i + *RnM i + (RnTi + >RnADi + RRnZi + RnLi,
 where the dependent variables are the detrended standard deviations of employment, production workers and non-
production workers.
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more importantly, the results appear to indicate that the presence of even small amounts of sunk costs
seem sufficient to induce considerable hysteresis. This quantitative result further highlights the need to
evaluate sunk costs carefully - even when they are small in magnitude.
Our findings related to uncertainty about profits take on a somewhat newer dimension.
Uncertainty is not explicitly mentioned as a factor that may have adverse effects on entry. The received
theory (Dixit, 1989; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) clearly recognizes uncertainty as a key determinant of
entry and exit. Our empirical results emphasize the significance of this effect. In addition, we find that
the quantitative effect of profit uncertainty is larger than those of sunk capital costs. At a broad brush,
this calls for emphasis on uncertainty when evaluating entry and exit and competitive effects in antitrust
analysis.
Second, examining the determinants of the volatility of firms and establishments is also
important from a wider perspective. For example, what if the number of firms fluctuates due to
reallocation of resources with little implication for other variables like employment? So, does the
fluctuation of firms correlate with important variables like employment? Our data shows that the cross-
industry correlation between the standard deviation of the number of firms and production workers, non-
production workers and total employment are 0.25, 0.42 and 0.32, respectively. They are statistically
significant and economically meaningful. We conducted a few simple experiments. First, just like for
the dependent variable in Eq.(3), we obtained the detrended standard deviation of employment,
production workers and non-production workers. Second, we estimated two sets of regressions: (a)
regress these employment standard deviations on the standard deviation of the detrended number of
firms; and (b) regress the employment standard deviations on the same set of explanatory variables as
in Eq.(3).22 For (a), about 22%-30% of the volatility in (relevant) industry worker category could be
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explained by the volatility of the number of firms alone. For (b), industries with greater profit uncertainty
have significantly lower volatility of the employment variables; the sunk cost results are somewhat
mixed; and higher R&D intensity also lowers employment volatility. While a detailed examination of
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that examining the forces that govern entry and
exit, and influence firm volatility, can shed useful light into labor market dynamics with implications
for search models, job creation and entrepreneurship (Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides, 2001;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998).
24
References
Appelbaum, Elie, and Chin Lim. “Contestable Markets under Uncertainty,” RAND Journal of Economics
16, 1985, 28-40.
Audretsch, David. Innovation and Industry Evolution. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.
Basu, Susanto. “Procyclical Productivity: Increasing Returns or Cyclical Utilization?” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 111, 1996, 719-751.
Baumol, William, John Panzar, and Robert Willig. Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982.
Burnside, Craig. “Production Function Regressions, Returns to Scale, and Externalities,” Journal of
Monetary Economics 37, 1996, 177-201.
Burnside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaum and Sergio Rebelo. “Capital Utilization and Returns to Scale,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics Annual, 1995, 67-119.
Caves, Richard, and Michael Porter. “From Entry Barriers to Mobility barriers,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 9, 241-267.
Cohen, Wesley and Richard Levin. “Empirical Studies of Innovation and Market Structure” in
Schmalensee, Richard and Robert Willig, ed., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: North
Holland, (1989).
Cooley, Thomas and Vincenzo Quadrini. “Financial Markets and Firm Dynamics,” American Economic
Review, 2001, 1286-1310.
Cabral, Luis, and José Mata. “On the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution: Facts and Theory,”
American Economic Review, 2003, forthcoming.
Davis, Steven, John Haltiwanger and Scott Schuh. Job Creation and Destruction. MIT Press, 1996.
Dixit, Avinash. “Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence,” Economic Journal 90, 95-106. 
Dixit, Avinash. “Entry and Exit Decisions under Uncertainty,” Journal of Political Economy 97, 1989,
620-638.
Dixit, Avinash, and Robert Pindyck. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1996.
Domowitz, Ian, Glenn Hubbard and Bruce Petersen. “Business Cycles and the Relationship Between
Concentration and Price-Cost Margins,” RAND Journal of Economics 17, 1986, 1-17.
25
Driver, Ciaran and Brendan Whelan. “The Effect of Business Risk on Manufacturing Investment,”
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 44, 2001, 403-412.
Driver, Ciaran, Katsushi Imai, Paul Temple and Giovanni Urga. “Explaining the Diversity of Industry
Responses to Uncertainty Using Long-Run Panel Survey Data,” Imperial College (University of
London), U.K., 2002.
Dunne, Timothy, Mark Roberts, and Larry Samuelson. “Patterns of entry and exit in U.S. manufacturing
industries,” RAND Journal of Economics 19, 1988, 495-515. 
Fazzari, Steven, Glenn Hubbard and Bruce Petersen, “Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment.”
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1988), 141-195.
Fonseca, Raquel, Paloma Lopez-Garcia, and Christopher Pissarides. “Entrepreneurship, Startup Costs
and Employment,” European Economic Review 45, 2001, 692-705.
  
Geroski, Paul, and Dennis Mueller. “The Persistence of Profits in Perspective,” in Dennis Mueller (ed.),
The Dynamics of Company Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Geroski, Paul, and Joachim Schwalbach. Entry and Market Contestability. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
Ghosal, Vivek. “The Impact of Uncertainty and Sunk Costs on Firm Survival and Industry Dynamics,”
Georgia Institute of Technology, 2002.
Ghosal, Vivek. “Product Market Competition and Industry Price-Cost Margin Fluctuations: Role of
Energy Price and Monetary Changes,” International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, 2000, 415-
444.
Ghosal, Vivek and Prakash Loungani. “The Differential Impact of Uncertainty on Investment in Small
and Large Businesses,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 82, 2000, 338-343.
Ghosal, Vivek and Prakash Loungani. “Product Market Competition and the Impact of Price Uncertainty
on Investment,” Journal of Industrial Economics 44, 1996, 217-228.
Gort, Michael and Steven Klepper. “Time Paths in the Diffusion of Product Innovations,” Economic
Journal 92, 1982, 630-653.
Greenwald, Bruce and Joseph Stiglitz. “Macroeconomic Models with Equity and Credit Rationing,”  in
Hubbard, R. Glenn. ed., Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990, 15-42.
Huizinga, John, “Inflation Uncertainty, Relative Price Uncertainty and Investment in U.S. Manufacturing
industries,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 25, 1993, 521-549.
Jovanovic, Boyan. “Selection and Evolution of Industry,” Econometrica 50, 1982, 649-670.
26
Jovanovic, Boyan and Glenn MacDonald. “The Life Cycle of a Competitive Industry,” Journal of
Political Economy 102, 1994, 322-347.
Kessides, Ioannis. “Market Concentration, Contestability and Sunk Costs,” Review of Economics and
Statistics 72, 1990, 614-622.
Kessides, Ioannis. “Advertising, Sunk Costs and Barriers to Entry,” Review of Economics and Statistics
68, 1986, 84-95.
Lensink, Robert, Hong Bo, and Elmer Sterken. Investment, Capital Market Imperfections, and
Uncertainty. Edward Elgar. 2001.
Mortensen, Dale, and Christopher Pissarides. “Technological Progress, Job Creation and Job
Destruction,” Review of Economic Dynamics 1, 1998, 733-753.
Pakes, Ariel, and Richard Ericson. “Empirical Implications of Alternate Models of Firm Dynamics,”
Journal of Economic Theory 79, 1998, 1-45.
Rosenberg, Mats. “Does Uncertainty Affect Investment and Labor Demand?” Swedish School of
Economics and Business Administration, 2002.
Schmalensee, Richard, “Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and Performance,” in Schmalensee, Richard
and Robert Willig, ed., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: North Holland, (1989).
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny. “Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium
Approach,”Journal of Finance 47, 1992, 1343-1366.
Spence, Michael. “Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing,” Bell Journal of Investment
8, 534-544.
Spencer, Barbara, and James Brander. “Pre-Commitment and Flexibility: Applications to Oligopoly
Theory,” European Economic Review 36, 1992, 1601-1626.
Sutton, John. Sunk Costs and Market Structure. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Sutton, John. “Gibrat’s Legacy,” Journal of Economic Literature 35, 1997(a), 40-59.
Sutton, John. Technology and Market Structure. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997(b).
U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 1997.
Williamson, Oliver. “Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance, 1988, 567-91.
Winter, Sidney. “Schumpeterian Competition in Alternative Technological Regimes,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization 5, 1984, 287-320.
27
Appendix A: Data Sources, Variables and Measurement.
A. The U.S. SIC 4-Digit Manufacturing Industry Database.
Variable Source Years Available
Industry time-series data:
sales, investment, capital
stock, costs, etc.
Bartlesman and Gray (1998):
Annual Survey and Census of
Manufacturing.
1958-1994
Number of firms and
establishments.
Census of Manufacturing 1963, 67, 72, 77, 82, 87, 92.
Used capital expenditures. Census of Manufacturing 1972, 82, 92.
Rental payments. Census of Manufacturing 1972, 82, 92.
Depreciation payments. Census of Manufacturing 1972, 82, 92.
R&D Intensity. FTC Line-of-Business Data 1975-1978
Advertizing Intensity. FTC Line-of-Business Data 1975-1978
Aggregate variables:
unemployment rate, federal
funds rate, energy prices.
Economic Report of the
President.
1958-1994.
The following industries were excluded from the sample: (i) “Not elsewhere classified” since they do
not correspond to well defined product markets; (ii) Industries that could not be matched properly over
time due to SIC definitional changes; there were important definition changes in 1972 and 1987. For
these industries, the industry time-series and other structural characteristics data are not comparable over
the sample period; and (iii) Industries that had missing data on the industry structure, sunk cost, R&D
or advertising variables. The final sample contains 266 SIC 4-digit manufacturing industries. Given the
above exclusions, the final sample contains industries that are mature and well defined over the sample
period and have data consistency.
We use the FTC line-of-business data for R&D and advertizing. The data are high quality and
have been used in many studies. Unfortunately they are available only for a few years and were
discontinued. In addition, some of the data are at the SIC 3-digit level. Where data were available only
at the 3-digit level, all the underlying 4-digit industries were assumed to have the same values. I am not
aware of the availability of SIC 4-digit data for R&D and advertizing for all our industries over the 30
year period.
B. Sunk Entry Capital Requirements.
The construction here follows Sutton (1991, Ch.2). Let > (>0) be defined as the setup cost or the minimal
level of sunk cost that an entrant must incur, and S denote total industry sales (market size). Thus, in
theory, >/S is the sunk cost relative to market size. In quantifying setup/sunk costs (Sutton 1991, Ch.4),
     23 Sutton notes limitations of this proxy. For example, (i) he assumes that the capital-output ratio of the median
plant is representative of the entire industry, and this is unlikely to be the case; (ii) the book value of capital assets
is used to compute the capital-sales ratio, but the book value underestimates the current replacement cost; (iii) the
computation assumes that the age structure of capital does not vary across industries, and this is unrealistic.
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he proposes a proxy that measures the “relative” level of setup costs across industries. Sunk costs are
assumed to be proportional to the cost of constructing a single plant of minimum efficient scale (MES).
Let Q be a measure of MES, where Q is the output of the median plant relative to industry output.
Assume that the capital-sales ratio of the median firm is the same as the industry as a whole and denote
industry capital-sales ratio by K/S. Then (>/S)=Q(K/S). If we can obtain a proxy for Q, and have data
for industry K and S, we can approximate >/S. Q is constructed using the distribution of plants within
each SIC 4-digit industry according to employment size. Let ‘m’ be the number of group sizes within
the industry, and ‘nj’ and ‘Sj’ denote number of plants and total sales of the jth size group (j=1,...,m.). Let
Msj=(Sj/nj); Se=(1/m)Gj(Msj); and So=GjSj. Then Q=(Se/So). Using Q and industry K/S, we obtain a proxy
for >/S. We label the term Q(K/S) as M(EK) (sunk costs - entry capital). As noted by Sutton (p.98), the
cross-industry variation in M(EK) provides a rough proxy for the cross-industry variation in sunk costs.23
We obtained data to calculate M(EK) for the Census years, 1972, 1982 and 1992 (same time periods as
for M(RE), M(US) and M(DE)).
C. Factor-Utilization Adjusted Solow Residual.
Burnside (1996) assumes that gross output Q is a differentiable function of unobserved capital “services”
(S), labor hours (H), materials (M) and energy (E): Qt=ZtF(St,Ht,Mt,Et), where Z represents exogenous
technology shock. Assuming that S is proportional to materials usage (Basu, 1996), or energy
consumption (Burnside, 1996), and competitive factor markets, the log-linear approximation to the
production function gives us the adjusted technology residual TFP(m):
(C.1) TFP(m) = [ªqt - (*Kt ªet+*Ht ªht+*M t ªmt+*Et ªet)],
where lower case letters denote logarithms, * is the share of the input in total revenue and ªs is replaced
by ªm (Basu), or ªe (Burnside). In our experiments and empirical results, it did not matter whether we
replaced ªs by ªm or ªe. Given that ªm is a broad based measure of input usage, we report results with
ªm as the proxy for ªs. We use TFP(m) as our benchmark measure of technological change.
Finally, we note an important issue with these computations; there are observations which
generate negative TFP values. This problem cannot be eliminated completely and has been extensively
discussed in the literature. Apart from cyclicality adjustments, some of the problems relate to input
quality improvements and the treatment of factor-share coefficients. Regarding the latter, in our
construction we have assumed that the shares of labor, materials, capital, etc, are constant throughout
the sample period. But if there is labor-saving innovation or innovation that increases materials intensity
over the sample period, then the constructed TFP measures will be biased.
Table 1. Cross-Industry Summary Statistics.
Percentile Distribution
Mean s.d. 25th 50th 75th
F(dFIRMS)i 120.8 181.2 22.1 54.1 135.2
F(dESTBS)i 129.7 188.1 22.6 61.5 143.6
F(B:S1)i 0.027 0.011 0.019 0.025 0.032
M(W)i 32.5 29.6 14.6 22.2 37.4
M(RE)i 90.1 94.6 28.8 55.5 107.5
M(US)i 21.5 37.8 8.4 12.6 18.3
M(DE)i 18.5 4.9 15.2 17.9 20.9
M(EK)i 0.014 0.060 0.003 0.005 0.012
R&D i 0.010 0.011 0.004 0.006 0.015
ADVT i 0.018 0.024 0.004 0.009 0.023
TFP(m)i 0.008 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.012
GRS i 0.019 0.023 0.007 0.019 0.033
There are 266 SIC 4-digit manufacturing industries in the sample. See data appendix for details.
Dependent Variables
F(dFIRMS)i: Standard deviation of the (linearly detrended) total number of firms over 1963-92.
F(dESTBS)i: Standard deviation of the (linearly detrended) total number of establishments over 1963-92.
First, for each industry, we linearly detrended the data on the number of firms. Second, for each industry, we
computed the standard deviation of the (detrended) number of firms over the 7 Census years. Thus, for each
industry, we get a measure of endemic volatility of the number of firms F(dFIRMS)i; given our sample, we have
266 observations for this variable. The table presents the cross-industry summary statistics of F(dFIRMS)i’s. For
the median industry, F(dFIRMS) was 54, with the 25th and 75th percentile values being 22 and 135. We repeated
this exercise for the total number of establishments to get F(dESTBS)i. Later, we also present results with firm
volatility computed from non-detrended data.
Explanatory Variables
F(B:S1)i: Profit uncertainty.
M(W)i: Sunk costs - weighted average sunk capital cost measure.
M(RE)i: Sunk costs - rental intensity.
M(US)i: Sunk costs - used capital intensity.
M(DE)i: Sunk costs - depreciation.
M(EK)i: Sunk costs - entry capital.
R&D i: Research and development intensity.
ADVTi: Advertising intensity.
TFP(m)i: Industry average total factor productivity growth over the sample period.
GRSi: Sales growth.
Table 2. Correlations Between Model Variables. 
F(B:S1) M(W) M(RE) M(US) M(DE) M(EK) R&D ADVT TFP(m) GRS
F(dFIRMS) -0.337 -0.290 -0.293 -0.143 -0.260 -0.107 -0.151 0.020 -0.079 0.084
F(dESTBS) -0.345 -0.292 -0.296 -0.150 -0.251 -0.109 -0.161 0.024 -0.089 0.081
See table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 3. Baseline Results.
Dependent Variable
F(dFIRMS)i F(dESTBS)i
Estimation Method
Instrument(s) for F(B)i
OLS
!
IV
F(e)i
IV
F(e)i; F(m)i
OLS
!
IV
F(e)i
IV
F(e)i; F(m)i
F(B:S1)i
Profit Uncertainty
-0.962
(0.001)
-1.847
(0.018)
-1.575
(0.029)
-1.044
(0.001)
-1.531
(0.022)
-1.492
(0.020)
M(W)i
Sunk Cost -
Weighted Index
-0.886
(0.001)
-0.771
(0.001)
-0.806
(0.001)
-0.815
(0.001)
-0.752
(0.001)
-0.757
(0.001)
R&Di
R&D Intensity
-0.087
(0.095)
-0.078
(0.119)
-0.081
(0.105)
-0.122
(0.014)
-0.118
(0.016)
-0.118
(0.015)
ADVTi
Advertising  Intensity
-0.060
(0.170)
-0.078
(0.114)
-0.073
(0.141)
-0.058
(0.139)
-0.068
(0.119)
-0.067
(0.129)
Intercept 2.572
(0.002)
-1.114
(0.736)
0.017
(0.995)
1.983
(0.013)
-0.040
(0.988)
0.122
(0.964)
'R2
Hausman Test
0.390
!
0.327
(0.779)
0.360
(0.678)
0.405
!
0.384
(0.734)
0.387
(0.684)
1. All samples contain 266 industries (see data appendix). The p-values (two-tailed) from
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. For p-values #0.001, they are indicated as 0.001.
The number for the Hausman test is the p-value for the P2 test.
2. For variable definitions see table 1. The instrumental variables for IV estimation are:
F(e): Standard deviation of industry-specific real energy price. 
F(m): Standard deviation of industry-specific real materials price.
Table 4. Additional Results.
Include Total Factor Productivity Growth and Industry Growth Effects.
Dependent Variable
F(dFIRMS)i F(dESTBS)i
Estimation Method
Instrument(s) for F(B)i
OLS
!
IV
F(e)i
IV
F(e)i; F(m)i
OLS
!
IV
F(e)i
IV
F(e)i; F(m)i
F(B:S1)i
Profit Uncertainty
-0.962
(0.001)
-1.918
(0.020)
-1.709
(0.031)
-1.040
(0.001)
-1.559
(0.028)
-1.545
(0.027)
M(W)i
Sunk Costs -
Weighted Index
-0.894
(0.001)
-0.793
(0.001)
-0.815
(0.001)
-0.820
(0.001)
-0.765
(0.001)
-0.767
(0.001)
R&Di
R&D Intensity
-0.086
(0.090)
-0.057
(0.308)
-0.064
(0.241)
-0.124
(0.011)
-0.108
(0.036)
-0.108
(0.031)
ADVTi
Advertising  Intensity
-0.062
(0.156)
-0.080
(0.109)
-0.076
(0.127)
-0.059
(0.129)
-0.069
(0.114)
-0.069
(0.121)
TFP(m)i
Total Factor Productivity
0.007
(0.681)
0.007
(0.702)
0.007
(0.696)
0.006
(0.728)
0.006
(0.735)
0.006
(0.734)
GRSi
Growth of Sales
-0.434
(0.901)
-4.105
(0.414)
-3.302
(0.502)
0.030
(0.993)
-2.025
(0.653)
-1.971
(0.664)
Intercept 2.646
(0.002)
-1.074
(0.742)
-0.261
(0.933)
2.040
(0.013)
0.108
(0.994)
0.073
(0.979)
'R2
Hausman Test
0.391 0.321
(0.942)
0.348
(0.565)
0.404
!
0.382
(0.948)
0.384
(0.866)
See tables 1 and 3 for details. The new explanatory variables included in this table are:
GRS: Industry average rate of growth of real sales over the sample period. (Note that since some industries are
declining and have negative average growth over the sample period, we cannot enter this variable in logarithms like
the other variables. Thus, the coefficient estimates of GRS are not readily comparable with the others.)  
Table 5. Additional Results.
Use Individual Sunk Cost Measures.
Dependent Variable: F(dFIRMS).
Estimation Method: OLS.
F(B:S1)i
Profit Uncertainty
-1.051
(0.001)
-1.173
(0.001)
-1.086
(0.001)
-1.102
(0.006)
M(RE)i
Sunk Costs -
Rental Intensity
-0.626
(0.001)
! ! !
M(US)i
Sunk Costs -
Used Intensity
! -0.553
(0.001)
! !
M(DE)i
Sunk Costs -
Depreciation
! ! -1.337
(0.001)
!
M(EK)i
Sunk Costs -
Entry Capital
! ! ! -0.769
(0.001)
R&Di
R&D Intensity
-0.084
(0.111)
-0.136
(0.013)
-0.224
(0.001)
0.014
(0.781)
ADVTi
Advertising  Intensity
-0.069
(0.127)
0.034
(0.439)
0.012
(0.789)
0.010
(0.784)
Intercept 1.916
(0.020)
0.616
(0.447)
2.778
(0.026)
-0.219
(0.746)
'R2 0.375 0.286 0.263 0.465
See tables 1 and 3 for details. The individual sunk cost measures are described in Section 4.2.
Table 6. Additional Checks of Robustness.
Estimation Method: OLS.
Dependent Variable
F(dFIRMS)i F(FIRMS)i
A: Baseline
Table 5, Col.1
B: Uncertainty
F(B:S2)i
C: Uncertainty
F(B:S3)i
D: Uncertainty
F(dB:S1)i
E: Profitability
F[B(depr)]i
F. Col.A 
explanatory
variables.
F(C)i
Profit Uncertainty
-0.962
(0.001)
-0.967
(0.001)
-0.953
(0.001)
-0.968
(0.001)
-0.881
(0.001)
-1.024
(0.001)
M(W)i
Sunk Cost -
Weighted Index
-0.886
(0.001)
-0.894
(0.001)
-0.882
(0.001)
-0.884
(0.001)
-0.894
(0.001)
-0.909
(0.001)
R&Di
R&D Intensity
-0.087
(0.095)
-0.087
(0.093)
-0.086
(0.098)
-0.081
(0.101)
-0.080
(0.130)
-0.126
(0.018)
ADVTi
Advertising  Intensity
-0.060
(0.170)
-0.058
(0.185)
-0.058
(0.184)
-0.050
(0.162)
-0.072
(0.123)
-0.040
(0.371)
Intercept 2.572
(0.002)
2.578
(0.002)
2.606
(0.002)
2.635
(0.002)
2.927
(0.001)
2.265
(0.007)
  'R2         0.390 0.391 0.388 0.389 0.377 0.405
See tables 1 and 3 for details. The column descriptions are as follows.
Column A: For comparison, column 1 from Table 5 is reproduced here.
Columns B and C: Use uncertainty measures F(B:S2) and F(B:S3).
Column D: Uses detrended profits to construct the uncertainty measure. 
Column E: Uses an alternate profitability measure B(depr) to construct the uncertainty measure F[B(depr)]. Forecasting equation is same as in column A.
Column F: Uses the non-detrended data on the number of firms to construct the volatility measure F(FIRMS)i. This is used as the dependent variable. The
explanatory variables are same as in column A.
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